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SUPREME COURT HISTORY PROJECT:
THE WARREN COURT 1957-1961
INTRODUCTION
C. Herman Pritchett*
In his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review analysis of
the Supreme Court's decisions during the 1963 term, Philip B.
Kurland, with characteristic pungency, suggested that, in light
of developments on the Court, the time might soon come for
"the subject of constitutional law [to] be turned back to the
political scientists [for] these students of political affairs real-
ized, before lawyers did, that the true measure of the Court's
work is quantitative and not qualitative."' Kurland was ex-
pressing his lack of enthusiasm for the work of certain political
scientists who were treating the Supreme Court as a major
policy organ of government and applying to it the same meth-
ods of analysis utilized in studying the legislative and adminis-
trative processes.
The "judicial behavior" movement, purportedly initiated
by this author's 1948 book, The Roosevelt Court: A Study of
Judicial Politics and Values,2 did seek to make considerable
use of quantitative methods. In The Roosevelt Court quantifi-
cation was very simplistic. The study centered on non-
unanimous decisions of the Court. The premise was that on
decision day the Court takes on the aspect of a small legislature
in which the members cast votes pro or con on significant issues
of public policy, and that these are not random differences of
opinion but rather reflect dissimilar value systems and con-
trasting political, economic and social views.
Two quantitative approaches to the study of judicial be-
havior were presented by this author in The Roosevelt Court.
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The first was an examination and recording of alignments be-
tween and among the Court's members in non-unanimous deci-
sions, in a search for consistent voting patterns or blocs. This
approach came to be known as bloc analysis. Voting regulari-
ties were in fact discovered, and used as a basis for theories as
to the value conflicts accounting for these patterns of voting
behavior. Such theorizing led to the second approach, which
sought to relate the Justices' votes to the dominant issues pres-
ent in the cases where disagreements were registered. "Box
scores," as critics called them, were prepared, giving the num-
ber of votes cast by each Justice for or against the constitu-
tional or legal contentions in related sets of cases. These tables
made it possible to compare the voting records of the justices
on such issues as civil liberties, criminal procedure, taxation,
and states' rights.
The Roosevelt Court went no further than bloc and issue
analysis. But other students of judicial behavior have subse-
quently been more innovative, and have utilized much more
sophisticated social science techniques. They range from Gutt-
man scaling and small group analysis to Spearman rank order
correlations, Shapley-Shubik indexes, and Boolean algebra.
There is considerable disagreement as to the value of these
more sophisticated tools for investigating judicial behavior, but
the relevance of data on judicial alignments to an understand-
ing of the Supreme Court's product is now fully established.
Bloc analysis has, in fact, received the blessing of high author-
ity; the Harvard Law Review has for almost two decades in-
cluded a table of voting alignments in its annual survey of the
Court's decisions.
In its Supreme Court Project, the Santa Clara Law Review
has applied the voting-alignment, bloc-analysis technique in a
study of the Warren Court, with very interesting results for
lawyers, historians, and the general public. The Warren Court
tends to be stereotyped in the minds of most people; it is re-
vered as a protector of civil liberties or condemned as a coddler
of criminals. But there was in fact no monolithic Warren Court.
It would be more accurate to say that there were seven Warren
Courts, for in a real sense every change in its composition re-
sulted in the convening of a new Court.
This proposition is not difficult to support. One Justice
can make a great difference in the decisions of a nine-judge
bench, for he is more than one-ninth of the Court. He is one-
fourth of the Court when it is deciding whether to grant certior-
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ari. He is one-fifth of a Court majority. He is a partner in eight
of the thirty-six possible dyadic relationships among the jus-
tices.
Earl Warren's Chief Justiceship covered sixteen terms and
extended through four presidencies. He served with sixteen
Associate Justices, who were appointed by five Presidents.
When Warren took office in 1953, eight years after Franklin
Roosevelt's death, there were still five Roosevelt appointees on
the bench, and President Truman had named three. President
Eisenhower was to appoint the Chief Justice and four Asso-
ciates, President Kennedy two Associates, and President John-
son two Associates. Translated into Warren Court judge-years,
Eisenhower appointees served sixty-one, Roosevelt appointees
forty-five, Truman appointees twenty-two, Kennedy appoint-
ees ten, and Johnson appointees six. Three Justices served for
the entire sixteen years-Warren himself, plus Hugo Black and
William 0. Douglas. The other principal figures were John M.
Harlan (fifteen years), Tom Clark (fourteen years), William J.
Brennan, Jr. (thirteen years), Potter Stewart (eleven years),
and Felix Frankfurter (nine years).
There is no easy way to characterize or differentiate the
seven Warren Courts. They had some uniformities, but there
were more differences. The first Court was of course the Court
that handed down Brown v. Board of Education,3 the decision,
which more than any other, created the public image of the
Court during Warren's leadership. Subsequent Courts faith-
fully followed the Brown lead. But on most other issues there
were advances and retreats and majorities one term that be-
came minorities the next. Thus, in 1957 the Court marched
up the hill to do battle with McCarthy-type congressional in-
vestigating committees in Watkins v. United States,' while two
years later it marched back down again in Barenblatt v. United
States.5
Changes in judicial thinking were usually associated with
changes in judicial personnel. The Court, without Frankfurter,
could not possibly be the same as the Court with Frankfurter.
From 1953 to 1961, the balance between liberal and conserva-
tive views could tip in either direction, but the Kennedy and
Johnson appointments to the Court gave the last seven years
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
5. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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of Warren's Chief Justiceship a decided liberal-activist charac-
ter.
For his study of the Warren Court, Professor Galloway has
consolidated the seven Warren Courts into three periods. The
voting patterns for the 1953-56 terms of the Court, which Gallo-
way characterized as witnessing "the emergence of judicial lib-
eralism," were analyzed in Volume 18 of this journal.' In this
issue, the 1957-1960 terms are studied, and the period is char-
acterized as an "abatement in the liberal trend." A third arti-
cle will cover the 1961-1968 terms and complete this extraordi-
narily interesting study. Professor Galloway's work is usefully
supplemented in this issue by more specialized analyses con-
centrating on one term (October 1957) and on the voting behav-
ior of individual Justices.
Max Lerner said that the New Deal's encounter with the
Supreme Court made it clear to everyone "that judicial deci-
sions are not babies brought by constitutional storks."7 Who
the Justices are makes a difference, and the precedential value
and survival prospects of controversial decisions depend to a
considerable degree on the standing of their sponsors and the
power relationships on the Court. The investigators engaged in
this noteworthy research project have made imaginative addi-
tions to the techniques of previous judicial voting analyses, and
are providing a solid quantitative foundation for a fuller under-
standing of Supreme Court decision making.
6. Galloway, The Early Years of the Warren Court: Emergence of Judicial Liber-
alism (1953-1957), 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 609 (1978).
7. M. LEANER, IDEAS FOR THE ICE AGE, 259 (1941).
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